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ABSTRACT 
The budget is the end product of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
process, which is submitted to Congress up to two years in advance of execution. Therefore, 
the Department of Defense will always demonstrate a monetary difference between the 
planning and execution phases. A significant difference between the planning and execution 
affect providers such as Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), which is responsible 
for managing and financing the purchase of parts. Between 2007 and 2017, there has been an 
average budget difference of $3.1B for Operation and Maintenance, Navy appropriation. 
NAVSUP receives the requirement from resource sponsors and budget submitting offices 
(BSO) two years in advance and determines how to invest by utilizing the inflation category 
code (ICC) such as Consumable parts (412) and Repairable parts (503). This study analyzed 
the budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 from 2007–2017 and demonstrated what budget 
line item (BLI) and BSO had the most significant contribution. For ICC 412 and 503, our 
analysis showed the most significant difference was observed in the years 2007–2011 and 
2014–2017, and that the BLI for Mission and Other Flight Operations (1A1A) and Mission 
and Other Ship Operations (1B1B) demonstrated the most significant budget difference. It was 
also determined that BSO for Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, and Commander, U.S. Pacific 
Fleet had the most significant impact on the budget differences for the identified BLIs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Naval Supply Systems Command’s (NAVSUP) mission is to ensure supplies are 
readily available to support the warfighting team. In order to achieve this mission, NAVSUP 
depends on demand signals provided by the fleet or its customers during the planning phase of 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budget cycle. Inventory levels are generated utilizing 
forecasting models, historical data and demand signals. NAVSUP has seen throughout the last 
11 years a trend in budget differences between what was planned and what was actually 
executed. This budget difference affects NAVSUP’s material readiness capability. At the 
conception of this research NAVSUP speculated a budget difference of $1.4B for any given 
fiscal year and was uncertain whether it was generated by one single or multiple commands. 
Obligation authority is given to NAVSUP by Congress to incur in contracts a lead time 
in advance of the customers’ requirements via the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF). 
NWCF is utilized to finance inventories of supplies or services. As Candreva (2017) points out 
in his book, National Defense Budgeting and Financial Management: Policy and Practice, the 
majority of the NWCF is reimbursed through sales from its customer base through various 
defense appropriations (Candreva, 2017). The supply management (SM) activity is one of the 
primary areas involved in the funding of inventories or materials. 
This research paper examines which appropriation has the highest significant budget 
difference between NWCF-SM Obligation authority and the funding appropriated by the 
customers during the execution phase of the DoD’s budget cycle. In addition, this research 
analyzed the following questions: What are the changes that affect the customer’s funding 
between the planning and execution phases, and what are the reasons for these changes (e.g., 
facts of life, schedule changes, funds reallocation to higher priority programs)? If there is a 
statistical relationship between the budget differences and marks issued by Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), can the statistical relationship be used to provide recommendation 
to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and the Office of Budget (FMB) to 
lock appropriate customer accounts within the NWCF-SM budget horizon of two years. This 
is the first time Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) budget differences have been 
analyzed in order to understand how they are generated and their effects on supply 
management. 
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To conduct the analysis for this research, budget differences for each appropriation were 
calculated by gathering historical data from the Program Budget Information System (PBIS). 
The historical data was broken into three different phases: 
• Phase 1: funding anticipated using the requirements identified in the Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) 
• Phase 2: the dollar amount NWCF-SM invested in fulfilling the requirements 
defined in the POM 
• Phase 3: the dollar amount the customer pays to receive the requirements 
 
Once data was collected, the appropriations that demonstrated the most significant difference 
between the dollar value initially budgeted and actual dollar value executed were identified. 
Using the data from PBIS, it is concluded that in six out of the 11 years reviewed in 
this analysis, the NWCF-SM has experienced a surge in demand from the customers during 
the execution phase of the budget cycle, decreasing overall NAVSUP’s net effectiveness and 
possibly an increase in the cost of material (PBIS, 2015). This surge is caused by the 
misalignment between the delivery of the material from repair or procurement lead time, and 
the customers or fleet demand. This misalignment impacts the fleet’s material readiness and 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) mission readiness. This study also discusses which 
budgeting submission offices (BSO) generated the greatest contribution to the budget 
difference effecting supply management. By identifying which BSO is the greatest budget 
difference contributor, NAVSUP has opportunities to further increase collaboration with these 
BSOs, which can increase supply readiness to the fleet. 
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II. THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND 
EXECUTION PROCESS AND THE NAVY WORKING CAPITAL FUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the process of how the defense 
budget is developed, the different key players who influence the process, and how they 
coordinate to create the final product, the president’s budget. This chapter also discusses the 
history and the operations of the NWCF-SM, and how NAVSUP plays a role in absorbing the 
repair and procurement lead time to ensure the fleet has the right mix of repair parts when they 
are needed. 
A. THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION 
PROCESS 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process is the tool used 
by the DoD to rationally allocate resources based on priorities identified in the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS). If this process is done 
correctly, it would ensure programs and requirements are funded to adequate levels. In addition, 
this process allows for prioritization to ensure the proper allocation is achieved among forces, 
manpower, material, and support within fiscal constraints. 
The PPBE process was first introduced by former Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 
Robert McNamara and Comptrollers Charles Hitch and Robert Anthony as the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). As discussed by McCaffrey and Jones (2004) 
in the Reform of Program Budgeting in the Department of Defense, the PPBS was implemented 
as an analysis and planning tool based on various plans and programs to achieve the goal of 
allocating the correct funding for the manning, training, and equipping of the military, and the 
operation and support of the defense system to support the NSS and NDS. They also note that, 
each service has its own system analysts, who use the system to document, justify, and allocate 
their own department resources. In addition, Candreva (2017) mentions that during this time, 
the control of the process was held at the OSD level (Candreva, 2017). McCaffery and Jones 
(2004) also explain that, in 1969 the Laird Reform changed the control of the PPBS process 
from the OSD level to the military department secretaries. They mention that in 1986, under 
the Goldwater–Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was given more 
power as the chief military advisor to OSD and the president. Thus, a bigger staff was needed 
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by the CJCS to engage in critical phases in the PPBS process (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). In 
addition, they note that in 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld redefined the process 
by adding the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and the Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG) and eliminating the one-year budgeting review; Rumsfeld also changed the process into 
the PPBE process. He believed he could accelerate the cycle by having the SecDef and the 
secretary’s staff engage in the decision-making process quicker with the implementation of 
these two programs (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). 
As mentioned by McCaffery and Jones (2004), in 2012, the DoD changed the 
programming and budget process. For each year, the department develops a single-year budget. 
Additionally, a five-year program/budget review is conducted, to provide greater reliability 
across budgets (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). The result of this process is a budget aligned with 
the various programs suggested by the different services and the defense agencies identified in 
the POM. 
The PPBE process is divided into four phases, as shown in Figure 1. These phases do 













Figure 1.  Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process.  
Adapted from Mistral Inc. (2013). 
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1. Planning Phase 
In the planning phase, the NSS and the NDS are analyzed to identify the capabilities 
required to support these strategic documents. Every year, the SecDef issues the DPG in the late 
spring/early summer to provide guidance to the DoD planners regarding the development of the 
force structure to support the NSS and the NDS. The DPG also identifies the fiscal constraints 
that might impact the programming and budgeting phase. At the beginning of each four-year 
administration, a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is generated. The purpose of this review is 
to evaluate Defense assumptions and strategies, and how these will support the initiatives and 
goals for the administration (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management 
and Comptroller [OASN(FM&C)], 2016). The Future Year Defense Plan is part of the guidance 
issued by the SecDef to the different services to assist with the planning and preparing of the 
POM. 
2. Programming Phase 
The programming phase begins with each military component developing a POM to 
address how it plans to allocate resources to meet the priorities specified in the various 
guidance (e.g., President’s National Defense Strategy, Chief of Naval Operations [Sponsor 
Program Proposals] Planning Guidance, and Office of Management and Budget’s [OMB] 
Fiscal Guidance). To develop the POM, each service must analyze their current capabilities and 
those needed to support the provided strategic guidance and identify shortfalls and 
overmatches. Each military component identifies gaps in its capabilities and analyzes all the 
alternative material solutions available that satisfy the gaps; these are included in the POM as 
programs. This process is not conducted every year, hence, “The POM is developed in the 
even-numbered years and reviewed in odd-numbered years” (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 
151). McCaffrey and Jones (2004) explain that the JCS reviews the POM from each military 
component, to ensure its adherence to the various guidance. Once JCS gives approval of the 
POM, the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) is issued by the CJCS to SecDef. The CPA 
then becomes SecDef’s assessment of the adequacy and risk in the POMs for each military 
component and defense agency (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). 
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3. Budgeting Phase 
This phase begins with the approval of all the programs found in each of the military 
component’s and defense agency’s POMs. The primary purpose of this phase is to scrutinize 
the first one or two years of the POM to allocate resources adequately and to produce a DoD 
budget request that can be defended effectively before Congress. The Department of the Navy 
(DoN) Budget Guidance Manual points out that each DoD component submits its POM in 
addition to its proposed budget estimate as part of its Budget Estimate Submission (BES) to 
the OSD. The BES for each military component is reviewed by the OSD in collaboration with 
OMB to ensure the budget is defendable and executable within the financial constraints. The 
manual also explains that the focus is primarily on the budget year perspective and consists 
of the best pricing, an achievable schedule, dollar and manpower balance, consistency within 
guidance and the timely execution of funds (OASN[FM&C], 2016). Once OSD completes the 
review, “the final defense budget is sent to OMB to become part of the President’s budget” 
(McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 153). Congress requires the Presidential Budget to be submitted 
on the first Monday in February of each year (Macdonald, 2013). 
4. Execution Phase 
As mentioned in the Department of the Navy (DoN) Budget Guidance Manual, this 
phase consists of the process of managing the budget authority once it is appropriated. The 
execution phase begins with Congress issuing an authorization bill, which authorizes an agency 
to carry out a program and, in some cases, places a limit on the amount that can be appropriated 
for the program. Congress also signs an appropriation bill, which contains budget authority 
that allows the government to incur financial obligations for the programs identified in the 
approved budget. The manual explains that most budgetary resources are made available by 
apportionment from the OMB to the different military components and defense agencies. 
These apportionments are made by time period or by activity to ensure the effective use of 
available funds and to preclude the need for additional appropriations (OASN[FM&C], 2016). 
B. PPBE PROCESS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
Candreva (2017) notes that the DoD PPBE process guides the PPBE process in the DoN. 
OPNAV Code N8 runs the PPBE process for the Navy. Each of the assistants of N8 assist in 
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the different phases of the PPBE process: planning (N81), programming (N80), and budgeting 
and execution (N82). While the N8 may run the PPBE process for the Navy, it is not responsible 
for determining the content of the Navy budget; that task is a collaboration between the Deputy 
Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNO), the fleets, and the BSOs (Candreva, 2017). 
C. PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM 
As discussed by Candreva (2017), the POM provides information about all the 
programs for the Navy in a six-year period. The POM focuses on the current and the requested 
funding stream within a five-year period: the items, objects, enhancements, and capabilities 
that are being requested; the anticipated outcome of the funding; and the risks imposed if these 
are not funded. This process reflects the Future Years Defense Program (Candreva, 2017). He 
also notes that the POM is developed during the programming phase, which begins each 
September, with reviews of intelligence, strategy, warfare areas, and support tasks. The POM 
includes an analysis of the mission, objectives, and alternative methods to achieve a set goal 
and the allocation of resources. As discussed in the report published by RAND, Navy Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution: A Reference Guide for Senior Leaders, Managers, 
and Action Officers, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Programming Division (N80) is 
the primary department code involved in the Navy POM development process, with guidance 
from the CNO through the DCNOs. The report also states that N80 uses the Sponsor Program 
Proposal (SPP), developed by the resource sponsors, as a basis to create the POM. The SPPs 
are submitted to N80 in the form of changes to the FYDP, which is based on the previous 
president’s budget (Blickerstein, Yurchak, Martin, Sollinger & Tremblay, 2016). 
According to the Naval Administrative Message (NAVADMIN), POM Process 
Reorganization and OPNAV Staff Realignment, in October 2016, the CNO realigned the POM 
development process to create a culture of collaboration and transparency among the key 
stakeholders that facilitates decision-making. Strategic guidance and priorities are provided 
through the CNO Guidance for Development early in the POM cycle, to enable the 
determination of resourcing decisions and priorities. The NAVADMIN also states that to assist 
in integrating all the players in the POM development, three overlapping phases were created 
in which there are supported and supporting players. The NAVADMIN states further that with 
the POM process beginning three months earlier; prior year POMs will be used by resource 
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sponsors, and that these resource sponsors will no longer require the baselines and SPPs. The 
goal of this new process is described by the CNO as “The end product of the POM development 
process will be a strategy-based, fiscally balanced, and defendable Navy Program for 
submission to the OSD which appropriately implements OSD fiscal and programming 
guidance provided” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2016). 
D. APPROPRIATION 
As stated in the Financial Management Policy Manual (FMPM), an appropriation is 
defined as, “the authority provided by an act of Congress to incur obligations to make payments 
from the Treasury for specific amounts and within specific timeframes” (OASN[FM&B], 
2019, p. 1–1). The DoD receives appropriations from Congress, which then is distributed 
among the various defense agencies and services. (OASN[FM&B], 2019). 
An appropriation provides details on what the funds are used for. The DoN has five types 
of appropriations: Military Construction, Navy (MCN); Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) 
Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N); Procurement; and Research, Development, Test, 
and Evaluation, Navy (RDT&E,N) (OASN[FM&B], 2019). 
1. Military Construction, Navy 
• The MCN includes projects for construction on land that is not in the 
inventory of the DoD, by acquiring, constructing, converting, 
rehabilitating, or installing permanent or temporary public works, including 
land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenance, utilities, and equipment. 
Construction also includes the addition, expansion, extension, alteration, 
conversion or replacement of an existing real property facility or the 
relocation of a real property. (OASN[FM&B], 2019) 
2. Military Personnel, Navy 
• The MPN appropriation provides annual resources necessary to 
compensate active duty Navy military personnel required to staff approved 
force structure and support infrastructure, including those officers and 
enlisted personnel within the individual accounts: students, trainees, 
transients, patients, prisoners, holdees and midshipmen. (OASN[FM&B], 
2019) 
3. Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
• The O&M,N appropriation finances the day-to-day cost of operating naval 
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forces, including fuel, supplies, and maintenance of ships, Navy and Marine 
Corps aircrafts, related weapons systems, and support establishment ashore. 
(OASN[FM&B], 2019) 
4. Procurement 
• The procurement appropriation is divided into four categories: Aircraft 
Procurement, Navy (APN); Ship Building and Conversion, Navy (SCN); 
Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN); and Other Procurement, Navy 
(OPN). (OASN[FM&B], 2019) 
a. Aircraft Procurement, Navy 
• The APN appropriation finances the procurement of Navy and Marine Corps 
aircraft and provides for related supporting programs. Supporting 
programs include equipment for modification of in-service aircraft; aircraft 
spare parts; ground support and training equipment; and industrial facilities 
and tools. (OASN[FM&B], 2019) 
b. Ship Building and Conversion, Navy 
• The SCN appropriation finances the construction of new ships and 
conversion of existing ships, including all hulls, mechanical and electrical 
equipment, electronics, guns, torpedo and missile launching systems, and 
communications systems. (OASN[FM&B], 2019) 
c. Weapons Procurement, Navy 
• The WPN appropriation finances the procurement of missiles, torpedoes, 
guns, and supporting equipment for naval forces and Marine air forces. 
(OASN[FM&B], 2019) 
d. Other Procurement, Navy 
• The OPN appropriation finances the procurement, production, and 
modernization of equipment not otherwise provided for. Such equipment 
ranges from the latest electronic sensors required to update the naval forces, 
trucks training equipment, and spare parts. This equipment is an integral 
part of programs to improve the fleet and shore establishment by 
maintaining or expanding existing capabilities or replacing ineffective units. 
(OASN[FM&B], 2019) 
5. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy 
• This appropriation finances research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) efforts performed by contractors and government installations to 
develop equipment, material, or computer application software; 
Development, Test, and Evaluation (DT&E); and its Initial Operational Test 
and Evaluation (IOT&E). These efforts may include purchases of end items, 
weapons, equipment, components and materials as well as performance of 
services. (OASN[FM&B], 2019). 
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E. DEFENSE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS 
This section discusses the history of the DoD’s financial management regulations and 
emphasizes the type of funding that NAVSUP utilizes when making purchases that support the 
fleet. Details are provided to explain the depth of these regulations and to emphasize which 
volume will be most applicable to NAVSUP. 
1. History 
The Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR), DoD 7000.14-
R (DoD, 2017), is the leading instruction that provides the procedures, regulations, and policy 
for DoD activities. The FMR states that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief 
Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO) is the point of contact who has the authority to issue this 
financial management regulation. The FMR has a total of 15 volumes, but the most relevant 
portion to NAVSUP is volume 11B, which is Reimbursable Operations, Policy and Procedures-
Working Capital Funds (WCF) because it details the functions of WCF activities, financial 
management directives, function, and systems (DoD, 2017). 
F. THE NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND 
This section explains the mission of NAVSUP and gives a brief history of its origins in 
the DoD. It also discusses NAVSUP’s mission of SM. NAVSUP’s SM is what keeps the fleet 
stocked with the appropriate amount of parts to maintain mission readiness. NAVSUP 
adequately supports the SM mission by applying a multitude of processes. 
1. Mission 
Hanely (2009) in the article, “NAVSUP FLC Pearl Harbor Hosts NAVSUP Assistant 
Commander for Financial Management and Comptroller” writes that, on May 1, 1966, 
NAVSUP was created, as a realignment from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 
(BUSANDA). He also explains that the intent for this change was to back up the Chief of 
Naval Material Command, which was the latest creation in major Navy commands and had only 
been around for a year. Hanley (2009) in the article emphasizes that NAVSUP has the mission 
to provide material readiness through supplies, and services that support the joint warfighting 
team. Dortch (2016) in the article “Naval Systems Command Celebrates 50th Anniversary” 
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explains that a continuous task for NAVSUP is to provide a centralized inventory location that 
enhances the supply chain effectiveness. (Dortch, 2016). 
2. Supply Management 
As noted in the “NAVSUP Navy Working Capital Fund Supply Management” 
presentation by Spencer (2017), within the many missions of NAVSUP, one area of focus is SM. 
SM performs inventory oversight that results in the sale of repairable and consumable parts to 
various customers. He also mentions that SM plays a critical role in the availability of the proper 
equipment, spare inventory, and adequate training in support of the operating forces. Spencer also 
comments that included in the price of the items being sold by NAVSUP is the cost recovery rate. 
The cost recovery rate is used to recover the funds used to purchase the parts or services and 
operating costs (Spencer, 2017). The payment loop is completed when material is delivered, or 
services are provided and payment is made by the customers utilizing the appropriate obligations 
(OASN[FM&B], 2018). 
3. NAVSUP Logistics Efficiencies 
In the article written for the Navy Supply Corps Newsletter, “Employing Supply Chain 
Analytics for Logistics Efficiencies,” Gabel (2018) states that NAVSUP uses demand signals from 
the fleet and their associated weapons systems to determine the inventory levels to maintain and 
how much to invest. Gabel goes on to add that NAVSUP uses information technology systems to 
integrate the various programs within the DoN, which strengthen the NAVSUP supply chain 
(Gabel, 2018). 
During the programming phase, the requirements needed are submitted to a customer- 
provider such as NAVSUP. The role of NAVSUP is to take the requirement from the fleet and 
ensure that adequate stock is on-hand on time. As discussed in the Department of the Navy Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2018, Budget Estimates. Justifications of Estimates Navy Working Capital Fund, 
“NAVSUP uses a lead-time of one year for maritime delivery and two years for aviation” 
(OASN[FM&B)], 2018). When the fleet is in the execution portion of the budget cycle and appropriations 
have been approved by Congress, the cycle for the NWCF begins. 
G. THE NAVAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND 
As Candreva (2017) points out in the book National Defense Budgeting and Financial 
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Management: Policy and Practice, the NWCF is part of the overarching WCF that the U.S. 
government utilizes. The NWCF has been in establishment since the 1800s and is one of the many 
WCFs the DoD utilizes. Candreva (2017) goes on to say that when a revolving fund is utilized by 
the DoD, all income is from the applicable command and is available to fund ongoing operations 
without any limitations per fiscal year (Candreva, 2017). Since NAVSUP utilizes revolving funds, 
it accepts job orders from customers. NAVSUP uses the revolving funds to finance their operating 
cost and the cost of the part or service offered. Candreva (2017) also explains that, once the job 
order is completed, the customer is billed, and payment is submitted by the customer, utilizing 
Congress-approved appropriations. Payment received from the customer is used to reimburse the 
revolving funds. He mentions that the WCF is a strategy that is like the strategies in the private 
financial sector, such as resource management, cost accounting, cost allocation, and any kind of 
customer-provider relationship that incorporates contracts. In addition, Candreva (2017) states that 
the WCFs are aligned to a particular business in which budget authority is made up from goods 
sold and customers that reimburse costs with funds that are appropriated. He explains that it is 
possible for a command to gain a multitude of various funding from different sources, and some 
of that funding must be combined to pay for things such as overhead and indirect expenses. He 
adds that it is apparent that it is a buyer-seller relationship since the seller will recover the cost of 
services or the cost of the goods. Costs can include all indirect and overhead costs, and the seller 
will maintain a financial ledger that is commercial in appearance (e.g., income statements, balance 
sheets, depreciated capital assets, etc.). Candreva (2017) clarifies that pricing is an area in which 
WCF differs from the private financial sector: Pricing is based on a fully allocated cost model and 
not by pressures from the stock market, there are no associated pressures with generating profits 
for a firm, and the charged amount to the customers will not vary throughout the year. 
1. How It Operates (Process) 
A customer receives an appropriation to finance a program. The customer decides to use 
the services of a WCF activity and initiates a reimbursable order. That order, once accepted, 
becomes a budget authority for the WCF activity to be used to cover the full cost of delivering the 
service. 
According to Candreva (2017), the WCF activity sets up unique job order numbers to 
account for each customer’s order, direct material, and labor cost charged for each job order. He 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 13 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
explains that as a worker bills for time on the job or buys supplies for the job, the WCF activity 
earns the budget authority on the funding document. In addition, he states that the hourly rate 
charged must be higher than just the employee’s salary and benefits because the WCF receives 
no appropriation for overhead expenses such as electricity, janitorial, and non- billable labor (a 
secretary or the comptroller who does not work directly for a customer). Therefore, for each hour 
charged for the work, a portion of the earned revenue passes through and pays the employee, but 
the remainder goes into the WCF (the tank), where it loses its identity as a type of appropriation. 
Candreva (2017) goes on to say that indirect material, labor, and general and administrative 
expenses (overhead) are all charged to overhead accounts and are paid using the WCF. He 
continues to discuss that the financial incentive of the WCF commander is to fully recover all 
costs, otherwise known as breaking even. Since the command starts with a corpus of funding 
(represented by the tank), full cost recovery means the level of the tank does not rise or fall. A 
rising tank means that the command is recovering more than its costs; a falling tank level means 
that it is not recovering enough (Candreva, 2017). 
Candreva (2017) states further that if the rates are too high (or costs were 
underestimated), the activity may recover more revenue than its costs, and the fund grows. If the 
rates are too low (or costs are not contained), the activity may not recover all costs, and the fund 
shrinks. He clarifies that a tank that rises in a year will be drained by lowering rates charged to 
customers in the future. The command does not change its rate in the middle of the year to protect 
the interests of the paying customers. The intent of the stabilized rate is to make sure the mission-
funded programs achieve its goals and the cost risk is shifted to the WCF (Candreva, 2017). 
2. Revolving Funds (Groups) 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)), describes in the 
Department of the Navy, Navy Working Capital Fund Annual Report that, revolving funds are 
divided into two categories: stock funds and industrial funds. The OUSD (C), states that stock 
funds are to be used when, “making volume purchases of spare parts and other goods from 
commercial sources.” (Office of Under the Secretary of Defense Comptroller (OUSD(C), 2000, 
p.6). The inventory is stored until sold to the fleet at a marked-up price to include a surcharge. 
The OUSD(C) continues stating that, “Industrial funds are used to provide the operating forces 
with industrial and commercial goods and services, such as depot-level maintenance.” (OUSD(C), 
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2000, p. 6). Overhead and material costs are included in the price offered to the operating forces 
for any services and goods whether industrial or commercial based (OUSD(C), 2000). 
H. THE BUDGET SUBMITTING OFFICE 
As mentioned in the Department of the Navy (DoN) Budget Guidance Manual, the BSOs 
are the offices responsible for the preparation and submission of the BES up to Office of Budget 
for the DoN and OSD/OMB. BSOs are also responsible for preparing and providing answers to 
questions from the congressional committees to justify their budget submissions. These offices 
shown in Table 1 are responsible for verifying that subordinate offices submit required documents 
in time to meet the set deadlines. They also ensure BESs are within the scope of the program, and 
that these comply with fiscal, and policy guidance stipulated during the POM development, 
decisions made during the DoN review and with the Resource Management Decisions (RMD) 
before the president’s budget submission. The manual goes on to explain that BSOs are 
responsible for the proper pricing of budget estimates, including price escalation information; for 
reviewing budget adjustments made by FMB, the OSD/ OMB, and congressional committees. 
The BSO also prepare reclamas or appeals if required, in accordance with the guidance and 
schedules established by FMB (OASN[FM&C], 2016). 
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Table 1.  Budget Submission Office Listing.  




As explained in the report published by RAND, collaboration among the key 
stakeholders is critical in generating the DoN’s budget. Inputs are submitted by the resource 
sponsors, BSOs, N80, and FMB. Resource sponsors and N80 work together to determine the 
allocation of resources to ensure the right balance is achieved throughout the various programs 
based on the required resources over time. The report goes on further to state that BSOs are 
more engaged with the fleet therefore their estimates are based on how programmed resources 
are executed while taking in consideration fleet issues and maintenance. BSOs play a greater 
role in the proposed budgets for the APN, O&M,N, OPN, SCN, and WPN appropriations 
because they are more engaged with the fleet, and what is occurring in those arenas. 
(Blickerstein et al., 2016). 
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III. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the process used in this study 
to gather the data required to determine the differences between the actual and budgeted totals 
for the various appropriations, as well as which BLI and which BSO have the most significant 
impact on the budget difference. This chapter also discusses how the budget difference was 
calculated and how the BLIs and BSOs were identified. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This project examines the obligation authority granted by Congress for the NWCF- SM 
and the funding appropriated to the customers during the execution phase of the PPBE process. 
As noted in the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget Estimates. Justification 
of Estimates, Navy Working Capital Fund, the obligation authority is based on future demand 
signals received from customers. NAVSUP uses the obligation authority to incur in contracts, 
a lead-time in advance of the customers’ requirements (OASN[FM&B)], 2018). Macdonald 
(2013) comments in “The Navy Working Capital Fund Budget & Execution Cycle” article 
that, the budget phase is intricate and can go through various versions within the Navy, as it 
passes through OSD and finally through Congress (Macdonald, 2013). There will always be a 
difference between the funding obligation authority granted to the NWCF-SM and that 
appropriated by the customer. This is due to priority changes, leadership changes, mission 
changes, continuing resolutions (CR), and/or unforeseen events, such as natural disasters or 
collisions. 
The report Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, Navy Working Capital Fund explains that NAVSUP BSO (23) 
estimates the required demand for supplies using various forecasting models, demand signals 
from the fleet/customer-base and inputs from OPNAV program resource sponsors and 
Hardware System Command (HSC). NAVSUP BSO (23) then obligates funds ahead of 
anticipated customers’ needs for the procurement and repair of ships and aviation parts as well 
as ship and aviation consumables (OASN[FM&B)], 2018. Any changes in the assumptions used 
to create the estimates invalidate the estimates, therefore impacting the NWCF-SM funding. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 18 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
This study reviews historical budget proposals in the PBIS and DoD budgets, as well 
as the presidential budget reports to isolate which appropriation category demonstrates the 
highest difference between the proposed budget and the actual executed budget in addition to 
identifying if the problem lies within a specific BSO. 
B. DATA GATHERING 
As presented in the Program Budget Information System (PBIS) User’s Guide, PBIS is 
the system of record for planning and budgeting for the Navy. It supports a seamless transition 
between the different phases of the PPBE process. PBIS operates using an Oracle database, 
which is then accessed by users using a front-end web-based application. The user’s guide 
points out that PBIS is used for programming the POM and budgeting as well as tracking 
execution data and analyzing the Navy’s budget history. The system is used to provide detailed 
budget information which can be separated by fields such as appropriation, budget activity, and 
RMD for the OSD/OMB submission. The user’ guide adds that all BSOs must submit 
Budgetary Object Classification System (BOCS) data for each appropriation for which they 
obligate funds and for which they submit budget justification (CACI International, 2015). Using 
PBIS, data was collected to include budgeted totals one and two-year in advance and actual 
totals for fiscal years (FY) 2007– 2017. Since NAVSUP BSO (23) awards contracts and repair 
orders using NWCF-SM obligation authority one-two years in advance of the anticipated 
appropriated customer demand, the focus was on the budgeted funding requests for one and 
two-year in advance time frames. 
The data consisted of reports for each year stipulated for the O&M,N and the 
procurement appropriations (APN, OPN, SCN, and WPN). Each appropriation report was then 
broken down into various BLIs and inflation category codes (ICC), as well as the BSOs 
providing the estimations. The reports also detailed the current year (CY) and budgeted year 
(BY) proposed totals as well as the prior year (PY) actual total values for each appropriation. 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) Budget Guidance Manual defines the different 
fiscal years used in the PPBE process as PY, CY, and Budget Year One (BY1). PY data is 
based upon enacted appropriations, supplementals, and reprogramming action approved. Data 
is actual account information or actual dollar value as of November of each year. In addition, 
the manual explains that CY totals are based upon the amount appropriated by Congress 
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adjusted for any proposed above or below threshold reprogramming actions, supplementals, 
rescission, transfers, or fact-of-life changes. The manual also explains that BY1 is broken down 
into three different submission processes: 
• DoN submission: The Secretary of the Navy approves the POM or SPPs which 
are used to create the budget estimates for BY1. Approved programs will be fully 
funded using budget quality estimates. Pricing and program changes from the 
POM and from the president’s budget for BY1 will be clearly identified and fully 
justified. 
• OSD/OMB submission: Budget estimates for BY1 are based on guidance 
provided by OUSD(C), such as adjustments for pricing, feasibility, fact-of- life, 
and other adjustments made during the DoN review. 
• President’s Budget submission: Budget estimates for BY1 are based on the 
amounts approved by the president and by the SecDef as reflected in the RMDs. 
(OASN[FM&C], 2016) 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) Budget Guidance Manual notes that the standard 
prices for DoN-managed items used to develop supply activity group sales projections are 
based on the latest actual prices, adjusted for inflation under the ICC codes (OASN[FM&C], 
2016). Items managed by NAVSUP fall under ICC 412 (Navy Managed Supplies and 
Materials) and 503 (Navy Fund Equipment) OASN[FM&B], 2007) 
In the data set, the BLIs that were analyzed were under the O&M,N appropriation and 
had a significant dollar and percentage difference between the proposed and actual budget 
totals for fiscal years 2007–2017. There was a range of approximately 60 various BLIs that 
were identified under the O&M,N appropriation. Some BLIs had greater significance due to 
the dollar difference associated with the BLI. For example, a BLI such as Fleet Air Training 
(1A2A) might have multiple BSOs associated with it that equate to millions of dollars, 
therefore contributing to a higher percentage difference since it is a bigger program. The 
inverse could occur with a BLI such as Junior ROTC (3C5L), which is a smaller program with 
only one BSO. While Junior ROTC is a significant and meaningful program, it is not a 
multimillion-dollar program such as Fleet Air Training. 
Additionally, there was another parameter other than dollar value and percentage 
difference that helped make the data more specific. The ICC was used to narrow down the data 
that was collected from PBIS. According to the PBIS user’s guide, ICCs are “employed to 
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divide object class code data by inflation categories generated by OSD” (CACI International, 
2015, p. 8). The reason why NAVSUP is concerned with the 412 and 503 ICCs is because these 
are the ICC’s used by NAVSUP to finance the Navy-managed material. The 412 and 503 ICC’s 
fall under the O&M,N appropriation which is used to reimburse the NWCF-SM. For example, 
if Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) wants to ensure that parts are on the shelf, 
they budget funds in 412 and 503 ICC lines of their O&M,N budget to indicate an intention to 
execute funds for this material with NAVSUP. NAVSUP would utilize the NWCF-SM to 
procure the material. USFF would pay NAVSUP utilizing the approved O&M,N appropriation. 
By looking at a combination of the BLIs and ICCs, it can be determined quite quickly 
which entity is the biggest customer for NAVSUP, but even more specifically, which customer 
has a wider budget difference from dollar and percentage standpoints. 
C. BUDGET DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS 
When gathering data from PBIS for each appropriation, it is apparent that there is a 
difference between the planned and executed dollar amounts as shown in Figure 2. To 
determine what BLIs and BSOs had the most significant impact, a budget difference analysis 
was conducted for the total dollar values for the different appropriations that are associated 
with supply management for the years 2007–2017. A budget difference is a difference 
between the total amount budgeted or planned, and the actual amount incurred during the 
execution phase. The budget amount total, otherwise known as BY, is the baseline, which is 
submitted in the president’s budget for the given fiscal year. The actual dollar amounts 
executed, otherwise known as PY, is subtracted from the BY to calculate the budget 
difference. If the value of the difference is negative, that indicates the president’s budget was 
underbudgeted, and more money was expended during the execution phase than what was 
budgeted. If the value of the difference is positive, that indicates the president’s budget was 
overbudgeted, less money was expended during the execution phase than what was budgeted. 
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Figure 2.  Budgeted (BY) vs. Actuals (PY), Operation and Maintenance, Navy ($ in Thousands). 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
The average budget difference for the different appropriations analyzed was as 
followed: APN $723.475M; OPN $181.808M; SCN $696.309M, WPN $3.271M, and 
O&M,N $3.1B, as shown in Table 2 (Program Budget Information System [PBIS], 2015). 
Therefore, since O&M,N had a budget difference of $3.1B, this shows it was the highest 
contributor and would involve further analysis which will be discussed in this chapter. 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Appropriation Accounts. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 

























































O&M,N $3,170,122 7.88% $3,181,503 7.64% $3,502,380 8.87% -$690,816 -1.98% $8,438,150 21.37% 
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1. O&M,N Budget Difference Analysis 
The O&M,N appropriation funds the daily operating cost of the naval fleet 
(OASN[FM&B], 2019). To calculate the budget difference, data was obtained and analyzed 
from the BOCS report in PBIS for the budgeted and actuals totals for fiscal years 2007 to 2017. 
The budget difference was computed for each fiscal year, as shown in Table 3 (PBIS, 2015). 
Table 3.  Analysis of Budget Difference for Operation and Maintenance, Navy ($ in Thousands). 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 
 
For fiscal years 2007 and 2009 through 2011, the O&M,N budget was under budget, 
meaning the actual expenditure was less than expected. For fiscal years 2008 and 2012 through 
2017, the O&M,N budget was over budget, meaning the actual expenditure was more than 
expected (PBIS, 2015). 
The O&M,N appropriation is broken down into budget activities: Operating Forces, 
Mobilization, Training and Recruiting, and Administration and Service-wide Support. Each 
budget activity is further broken down into functions known as an activity group (AG) 
(OASN[FM&B], 2019). Each AG can then be further divided into budget line item (BLI). 
2. BLI Budget Difference 
Since the purpose of this study is to analyze the budget differences for ICCs 412 and 503, 
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only the BLIs that showed a consistent trend of having the ICC 412 and 503 were considered. The 
determined BLIs are shown in Table 4 (OASN[FM&B], 2018). 
 
Table 4.  List of Determined Budget Lines Items. 
Adapted from OASN[FM&B], 2018). 
 
Budget Activity 1- Operating Forces 
Budget Line Items 
Mission and Other Flight Operations 
Fleet Air Training 
Mission and Other Ship Operations 
Ship Operational Support and Training 
Combat Communications 
Equipment Maintenance 
Fleet Ballistic Missile 










Budget Activity 2 – Mobilization 
Budget Line Items 
Ship Activation/Inactivation 




Budget Activity 3 - Training and Recruiting 
Budget Line Items 





Budget Activity 4 - Administration and Service-wide Activities 
Budget Line Items  
Military Manpower & Personnel Mgt 4A4M 
Other Personnel Support 4A5M 
Service-wide Communications 4A6M 
 
 
To calculate the BLI budget difference, data was obtained and analyzed utilizing the 
BOCS reports from PBIS that contained information on budgeted and actuals for fiscal years 
2007 to 2017 as shown in Table 5 (PBIS, 2015). This process was replicated for all the 
determined BLIs. 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 24 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 5.  Yearly Comparison for BLI 1A1A. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 
 
The BLI that generated the most significant budget difference was determined by 
calculating the budget difference for each BLI. The BLI’s that demonstrated the greatest 
budget difference are shown in Table 6 (PBIS, 2015). A table with the budget differences for 
all the determined BLIs can be found in the appendix. 
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Table 6.  Budget Difference for Determined Budget Line Items. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
BLIs ($ in Thousands) 
Year 1A1A 1A2A 1B1B 
FY07 -$203,837 -5.68% -$26,728 -3.09% $,4609 0.15% 
FY08 -$135,888 -3.77% -$3,845 -0.41% -$119,468 -3.45% 
FY09 -$401,973 -10.39% -$58,637 -6.06% -$539,253 -15.24% 
FY10 -$250,456 -6.57% $780 0.65% -$72,411 -2.18% 
FY11 -$279,096 -6.30% $1,615,601 1986.11% -$81,276 -2.20% 
FY12 $751,077 15.77% $33,404 1.89% $1,393,669 36.48% 
FY13 $426,719 8.68% -$39,648 -2.10% $538,352 11.49% 
FY14 $19,699 0.40% -$79,821 -4.37% $1,161,102 29.89% 
FY15 $227,891 4.61% $39,896 2.42% $1,149,789 29.98% 
FY16 $58,878 1.19% -$216,084 -11.80% $702,749 16.39% 
FY17 $1,077,747 26.32% $53,657 3.12% $1,279,626 36.42% 
 
BLIs ($ in Thousands) 
Year 1C1C 3B2K 4A6M 
FY07 $199,989 62.87% -$7,861 -1.85% -$242,383 -30.35% 
FY08 -$4,346 -0.77% -$7,309 -1.54% -$59,127 -10.21% 
FY09 $8,150 1.29% -$26,479 -5.13% -$26,416 -6.94% 
FY10 $13,000 2.16% $80,847 6.37% $109,631 37.59% 
FY11 $25,007 4.07% -$1,529,092 -99.41% $126,655 37.00% 
FY12 $128,118 21.95% -$321 -3.55% $18,263 3.41% 
FY13 $89,745 14.48% $1,693 31.03% -$52,410 -14.43% 
FY14 $120,484 17.18% -$1,159 -12.47% $8,213 2.59% 
FY15 $84,834 11.97% -$292 -3.54% $12,881 3.79% 
FY16 $53,763 7.63% -$293 -3.59% $29,104 8.68% 
FY17 $81,300 14.55% $3,862 72.73% $207,760 149.00% 
To identify which BLI had the most significant budget difference per fiscal year, a 
descriptive analysis was conducted for each year, as shown in Table 7 (PBIS, 2015). The 
descriptive analysis of the budget difference provides a summary of the standard variation for 
each year. The BLI outliers were identified by using low and high parameters. Any BLI that fell 
outside of these parameters were considered outliers and required further analysis. These 
outliers are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics for Determined Budget Line Items. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 
 
Utilizing the low and high range described previously, the BLIs considered outliers, 
requiring further analysis, are shown in Table 8 (PBIS, 2015). 
 
Table 8.  Budget Line Item Outliers. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
BUDGET LINE ITEMS ($ in Thousands) 
FY07 
1A1A 1C1C 4A6M 








1A1A 3B2K 4A6M 






















Average Budget Difference for Determined Budget Line Items. 
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D. INFLATION CATEGORY CODE ANALYSIS 
All the BLI’s deemed as outliers were broken down into ICCs. The focus on this study 
was on ICCs 412 and 503, therefore only the BLI’s associated with these ICCs were analyzed. 
Subsequently, the ICCs 412 and 503 were divided into their respective BSOs to see which BSO 
contributed most to the budget difference. An example of how this analysis was conducted is 
shown in Table 9 (PBIS, 2015). 
Table 9.  Inflation Category Codes 412 and 503 Analysis. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 
FY 2017 1B1B  
Difference Between 
Budgeted and Actuals ICC BSO Budgeted BSO Appropriated BSO Actuals 
412 
60 $9,449 60 $17,278 60 $51,762 $42,313 
70 $40,582 70 $48,109 70 $144,783 $104,201 
503 
60 $77,419 60 $100,511 60 $288,867 $211,448 
70 $82,531 70 $147,727 70 $177,809 $95,278 
 
 
After concluding the analysis for the BLIs identified, the BSOs that continually 
generated the highest budget differences were Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60), and 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70) (PBIS, 2015). This would be expected, as these are the 
BSOs to the operational fleet that are the overall largest appropriated customers of the 412 and 
503 ICCs. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the BLIs that demonstrated the most 
significant budget difference for years 2007–2014, which were the BLI for Mission and Other 
Flight Operations (1A1A), and the BLI for Mission and Other Ship Operations (1B1B). To 
conduct this analysis, the Budget Estimates Justification of Estimates Reports were utilized to 
collect the performance criteria used to determine the estimated dollar values submitted to 
Congress as the proposed budget. These reports were also used to obtain the actual 
performance criteria that generated the actual dollar values during the execution phase. 
A. BLI 1A1A 
The Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/2009 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, February 2007, Operation and Maintenance, Navy report explains 
that the Mission and Other Flight Operations sub-activity group provides funding for the flying 
hours programmed for the Navy and Marine Corps aviation force. The flying hours program is 
used to maintain the mission readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps aviation force ensuring 
they are ready to perform their essential tasks to support national objectives. This report also 
notes that this sub-activity group also provides funding for the transportation of the support 
equipment, support staff and personnel as well as the training systems, that aid in training and 
the accomplishment of set primary missions. (OASN[FM&B], 2007). 
As shown in Figure 3, the 1A1A has demonstrated a budget difference for all the years 
from 2007–2017, but the greatest budget difference were seen for fiscal years 2007– 2010, 
2012–2013, and 2017 for which the budget difference was above the low and high parameters 
computed in the BLI budget difference analysis section. (PBIS, 2015) 
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Figure 3.  Percentage Change for 1A1A. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 
For 2007, the 1A1A budget was -5.68% under budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$3,338,871K was less than the planned $3,587,708K, as shown in Table 10 (PBIS, 2015) 
The estimates for FY 2007 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,132 
crews, and 1,550 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 588,606 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2006). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates. 
Justifications of Estimates, February 2008, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B], 2008), the actuals for FY 2007 include a force structure of 10 active carrier 
air wings, 2,144 crews, and 1,546 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria 
used to calculate the estimates were 733,066 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2008). 
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Table 10.  Yearly Comparison for BLI 1A1A ($ in Thousands). 




Utilizing the data shown in Figure 4, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60), and for ICC 503, it 
was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70) (PBIS, 2015). 
 
Figure 4.  1A1A Budget Difference for Inflation Category Codes 412 and 503 ($ in Thousands). 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
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For 2008, the 1A1A budget was -3.77% under budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$3,471,496K was less than the planned $3,607,384K, as shown in Table 10 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2008 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,116 
crews, and 1,535 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 598,143 flight hours. (OASN[FM&B], 2007) 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates. 
Justifications of Estimates, May 2009, Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OASN[FM&B], 
2009), the actuals for FY 2008 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,120 
crews, and 1,627 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 696,168 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2009). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 4, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
For 2009, the 1A1A budget was -10.39% under budget, where the actual expenditure 
of $3,466,928K was less than the planned $3,868,901K, as shown in Table 10 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2009 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,119 
crews, and 1,607 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 608,740 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2008). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates. 
Justifications of Estimates, February 2010, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B], 2010), the actuals for FY 2008 include a force structure of 10 active carrier 
air wings, 2,163 crews, and 1,843 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria 
used to calculate the estimates were 648,072 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2010). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 4, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60), and for ICC 503, it 
was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70) (PBIS, 2015). 
For 2010, the 1A1A budget was -6.57% under budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$3,563,544K was less than the planned $3,814,000K, as shown in Table 10 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2010 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,215 
crews, and 1,850 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
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calculate the estimates were 623,933 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2009) 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates. 
Justifications of Estimates, February 2011, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B], 2011), the actuals for FY 2010 include a force structure of 10 active carrier 
air wings, 2,288 crews, and 1,835 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria 
used to calculate the estimates were 675,738 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2011). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 4, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60), and for ICC 503, it 
was Commander, U.S. Fleet Force (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2012, the 1A1A budget was 8.67% over budget, where the actual expenditure 
of $5,344,863K was more than the planned $4,918,144K, as shown in Table 10 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2012 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,414 
crews, and 1,907 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 611,284 flight hours. (OASN[FM&B], 2011) 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Budget Estimates. 
Justifications of Estimates, April 2013, Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OASN[FM&B], 
2013), the actuals for FY 2012 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,421 
crews, and 1,893 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 686,039 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2013). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 4, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70), and for ICC 503, it 
was Commander, U.S. Fleet Force (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2013 the 1A1A budget was 8.67% over budget, where the actual expenditure 
of $5,344,863K was more than the planned $4,918,144K, as shown in Table 10 (PBIS, 2015) 
The estimates for FY 2013 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,354 
crews, and 1,913 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 615,086 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2012). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates. 
Justifications of Estimates, March 2014, Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OASN[FM&B], 
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2014), the actuals for FY 2013 include a force structure of 10 active carrier air wings, 2,357 crews, and 
1,874 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to calculate the estimates were 
580,827 flight hours (OASN[FM&B], 2014). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 4, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2017 the 1A1A budget was 26.32% over budget, where the actual expenditure 
of $5,172,512K was more than the planned $4,094,765K, as shown in Table 10 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2017 include a force structure of 9 active carrier air wings, 2,480 
crews, and 2,007 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 556,518 flight hours (OASN[FM&B]), 2016). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Estimates. 
Justifications of Estimates, February 2018, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B]), 2018), the actuals for FY 2013 include a force structure of 9 active carrier 
air wings, 2,480 crews, and 1,972 tactical primary authorized aircraft. The performance criteria 
used to calculate the estimates were 580,827 flight hours (OASN[FM&B]), 2018). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 4, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60), and for ICC 503, it 
was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70) (PBIS, 2015). 
B. BLI 1B1B 
The Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/2009 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, February 2007, Operation and Maintenance, Navy report explains 
that the Mission and Other Ship Operations (1B1B) sub-activity group funds operations of the 
deployed and non-deployed combat-ready warships and its supporting forces. These day-to-
day ships operating cost are required to perform missions essential to support national objectives. 
The report also notes that this sub-activity funds the training units, pier side and port services, 
maintenance, and administrative cost (OASN[FM&B], 2019). 
As shown in Figure 5, the 1B1B has demonstrated a budget difference for all the years 
from 2007–2017, but the greatest budget differences were seen for fiscal years 2008– 2009, 
2012–2017, for which the budget difference was above the low and high parameters computed 
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Figure 5.  Percentage Change for 1B1B. 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 
For FY 2008, the 1B1B budget was -3.45% under budget, where the actual expenditure 
of $3,344,222K was less than the planned $3,463,690K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2008 include a force structure of 286 battle force ships: 11 aircraft 
carriers, 111 surface combatants, 32 amphibious ships, 52 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 31 combat logistics ships, 14 mine warfare 
ships, and 17 support ships. The performance criteria used to calculate the estimates were 1,727 
ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 3,963 for non-deployed units 
(OASN[FM&B], 2007). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, May 2009, Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OASN[FM&B], 
2009), the actuals for FY 2008 include a force structure of 285 battle force ships: 11 aircraft 
carriers, 107 surface combatants, 32 amphibious ships, 53 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 30 combat logistics ships, 14 mine warfare 
ships, and 17 support ships. The actual performance criteria were 2,088 ship-steaming-days 
per quarter for deployed units and 3,214 for non-deployed units (OASN[FM&B], 2009). 
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Table 11.  Yearly Comparison for 1B1B ($ in Thousands). 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
 
 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70), and for ICC 503, it 
was Commander, U.S. Fleet Force (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 6.  1B1B Budget Difference for Inflation Category Codes 412 and 503 ($ in Thousands). 
Adapted from PBIS (2015). 
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For FY 2009, the 1B1B budget was 15.24% under budget, where the actual expenditure 
of $2,998,860K was less than the planned $3,538,113K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2009 include a force structure of 286 battle force ships: 11 aircraft 
carriers, 111 surface combatants, 31 amphibious ships, 53 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 31 combat logistics ships, 14 mine warfare 
ships, and 17 support ships. The performance criteria used to calculate the estimates were 1,936 
ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 4,043 for non-deployed units 
(OASN[FM&B], 2008). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, February 2010, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B], 2010), the actuals for FY 2009 include a force structure of 285 battle force 
ships: 11 aircraft carriers, 110 surface combatants, 31 amphibious ships, 53 nuclear attack 
submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 31 combat logistics ships, 
14 mine warfare ships, and 17 support ships. The actual performance criteria were 4,788 ship-
steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 2,688 for non- deployed units 
(OASN[FM&B], 2010). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Force (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2012, the 1B1B budget was 36.48% over budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$5,213,855K was more than the planned $3,820,186K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2012 include a force structure of 288 battle force ships: 11 aircraft 
carriers, 111 surface combatants, 30 amphibious ships, 54 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 31 combat logistics ships, 14 mine warfare 
ships, and 19 support ships. The performance criteria used to calculate the estimates were 3,545 
ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 2,568 for non-deployed units 
(OASN[FM&B], 2011). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, April 2013, Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OASN[FM&B], 
2013), the actuals for FY 2012 include a force structure of 285 battle force ships: 11 aircraft 
carriers, 110 surface combatants, 31 amphibious ships, 53 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
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ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 31 combat logistics ships, 14 mine warfare 
ships, and 17 support ships. The actual performance criteria were 4,788 ship- steaming-days 
per quarter for deployed units and 2,688 for non-deployed units (OASN[FM&B], 2013). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Force (60), and for ICC 503, it was 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2013, the 1B1B budget was 11.49% over budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$5,224,887K was more than the planned $4,686,535K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2013 include a force structure of 284 battle force ships: 10 aircraft 
carriers, 101 surface combatants, 31 amphibious ships, 55 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 32 combat logistics ships, 14 mine warfare 
ships, and 23 support ships. The performance criteria used to calculate the estimates were 3,832 
ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 3,055 for non-deployed units 
(OASN[FM&B], 2012). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, March 2014, Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OASN[FM&B], 
2015), actuals for FY 2013 include a force structure of 284 battle force ships: 10 aircraft 
carriers, 105 surface combatants, 30 amphibious ships, 54 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 32 combat logistics ships, 13 mine warfare 
ships, and 15 support ships. The actual performance criteria were 5,957 ship-steaming-days 
per quarter for deployed units and 3,695 for non-deployed units (OASN[FM&B], 2015). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Force (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2014, the 1B1B budget was 29.89% over budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$5,045,938K was more than the planned $3,884,836K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2014 include a force structure of 273 battle force ships: 10 aircraft 
carriers, 92 surface combatants, 29 amphibious ships, 55 nuclear attack submarines, 14 ballistic 
missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 31 combat logistics ships, 12 mine warfare  ships,  
and  26  support  ships.  The  performance  criteria  used  to  calculate the estimates were 3,127 
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ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 1,448 for non- deployed units 
(OASN[FM&B], 2013). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, February 2015, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B], 2015), actuals for FY 2014 include a force structure of 281 battle force ships: 
10 aircraft carriers, 98 surface combatants, 31 amphibious ships, 55 nuclear attack submarines, 
14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 30 combat logistics ships, 12 mine 
warfare ships, and 27 support ships. The actual performance criteria were 3,894 ship-steaming-
days per quarter for deployed units and 2,755 for non-deployed units (OASN[FM&B], 2015). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 was Commander, U.S. Fleet Force (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2015, the 1B1B budget was 29.98% over budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$4,985,161K was more than the planned $3,835,372K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2015 include a force structure of 271 battleship force: 10 aircraft 
carriers, 93 surface combatants, 30 amphibious ships, 54 nuclear attack submarines, 14 ballistic 
missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 29 combat logistics ships, 8 mine warfare ships, 19 
support ships and 10 Non-Battle Force Ships (Patrol Crafts). The performance criteria used to 
calculate the estimates were 3,453 ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 2,197 
for non-deployed units (OASN[FM&B], 2014). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, February 2016, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B], 2016), actuals for FY 2015 include a force structure of 271 battle force ships: 
10 aircraft carriers, 100 surface combatants, 30 amphibious ships, 54 nuclear attack 
submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 30 combat logistics ships, 
0 mine warfare ships, and 29 support ships and 0 Non-Battle Forces Ships (Patrol Control) 
(OASN[FM&B], 2016). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70) (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2016, the 1B1B budget was 16.39% over budget, where the actual expenditure of 
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$4,990,407K was more than the planned $4,287,658K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2016 include a force structure of 282 battleship force: 11 aircraft 
carriers, 98 surface combatants, 31 amphibious ships, 53 nuclear attack submarines, 14 ballistic 
missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 29 combat logistics ships,11 mine warfare ships, 31 
support ships. The performance criteria used to calculate the estimates were 3,654 ship-steaming-
days per quarter for deployed units and 1,980 for non-deployed units (OASN[FM&B], 2015). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, May 2017, Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OASN[FM&B], 
2017), actuals for FY 2016 include a force structure of 275 battle force ships: 10 aircraft 
carriers, 104 surface combatants, 31 amphibious ships, 52 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 29 combat logistics ships, 0 mine warfare 
ships, and 31 support ships and 0 Non-Battle Forces Ships (Patrol Control). The actual 
performance criteria are 3,899 ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 3,124 for 
non-deployed units (OASN[FM&B], 2017). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 and 503 was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70), (PBIS, 2015). 
For FY 2017 the 1B1B budget was 36.42% over budget, where the actual expenditure of 
$4,792,709K was more than the planned $3,513,083K, as shown in Table 11 (PBIS, 2015). 
The estimates for FY 2017 include a force structure of 287 battleship force: 11 aircraft 
carriers, 115 surface combatants, 32 amphibious ships, 52 nuclear attack submarines, 14 
ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 29 combat logistics ships, 0 mine warfare 
ships, 32 support ships. The performance criteria used to calculate the estimates were 3,526 
ship-steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 2,166 for non-deployed units 
(OASN[FM&B], 2016). 
According to the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Estimates. 
Justification of Estimates, February 2018, Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
(OASN[FM&B], 2018), actuals for FY 2017 include a force structure of 279 battle force ships: 
11 aircraft carriers, 109 surface combatants, 32 amphibious ships, 51 nuclear attack 
submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 missile submarines, 29 combat logistics ships, 
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0 mine warfare ships, and 30 support ships. The actual performance criteria were 3,938 ship-
steaming-days per quarter for deployed units and 2,661 for non-deployed unit (OASN[FM&B], 
2018). 
Utilizing the data shown in Figure 6, the BSO that had the greatest contribution to the 
budget difference for ICC 412 was Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70), and for ICC 503, it 
was Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60) (PBIS, 2015). 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 42 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 43 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The requirement of submitting a budget to Congress two years in advance of execution 
impacts the ability of providers such as NAVSUP to conduct their mission properly. 
NAVSUP’s mission is to ensure parts and services are readily available upon the needs of the 
customers. NAVSUP uses demand signals from customers and forecasting model to determine 
the quantities to procure in order to have them readily available. The planning cycle of the 
PPBE process is a crucial stage for NAVSUP since this is where the requirements and demands 
from the customers are determined, and procured quantities are considered. With the everyday 
global environment and its constant changes, it is no surprise that there is a difference between 
the planned and executed budgets, affecting the supply management functions provided by 
NAVSUP. 
The primary purpose of this research was to determine what appropriation had the 
highest significant budget difference between the NWCF-SM Obligation Authority and the 
funding appropriated by the customers during the execution phase, significantly impacting 
NAVSUP’s mission and materiel readiness. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
What appropriations have the highest significant budget difference between the 
NWCF-SM Obligation Authority and the funding appropriated by the customers during the 
execution phase? 
Since O&M,N had a budget difference of $3.1B (PBIS, 2015), this shows it is the 
highest contributor. While analyzing the data collected for FY 2007–2017 for the procurement 
appropriation: SCN, APN, WPN, OPN and O&M,N appropriation, the highest significant 
budget difference was seen for the O&M,N appropriation, as discussed in Chapter III section 
C. 
B. SECONDARY QUESTIONS 
What changes are there in the customers’ funding between buy-in and buy-out, and what 
are the reasons for the changes (e.g., facts of life, schedule changes, funds reallocation to higher 
priority programs)? 
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There are various changes that affect the customers’ funding between the buy-in and 
buy-out, variables such as the number flight hours, the size of the battle force, number of tactical 
primary authorized aircrafts, crew size, number of steaming days, major maintenance phases, 
and operation tempo (OPTEMPO). These changes are discussed in Chapter IV. 
To generate the estimates used during the planning of the budget, certain assumptions 
are determined for each variable — any changes in the assumptions used to play a role in 
generating the budget difference. As discussed in Chapter IV, the parameters used to generate 
the estimates for the BLI 1A1A were the number of tactical primary authorized aircraft and the 
flight-hours. In FY 2012 the assumption was 611,284 flight- hours would be flown, and 1,907 
tactical primary authorized aircraft would be used (OASN[FM&B], 2011), but 686,039 flight-
hours were flown and only 1,893 tactical primary authorized aircraft were used 
(OASN[FM&B], 2013). This change in the assumption from 611,284 (OASN[FM&B], 2011) 
to 686,039 (OASN[FM&B], 2013) flight-hours impacted the budget for 1A1A for FY2012 and 
contributed to its overbudget of 8.67% (PBIS, 2015), as discussed in Chapter IV. 
Even though CR was not included in the analysis, it does play a role in generating the 
budget difference. A CR makes long-term planning nearly impossible; this causes an 
uncertainty in the budget flow. CR is interrupting the flow of funding while being released 
through continuing appropriation and Omnibus appropriation bills. The DoD has been in at 
least one CR for all the years analyzed, but the most significant budget differences were seen 
during the years 2012 and 2017. Per Congressional records (House of Representative 2028, 
2016), in 2017 Congress signed a CR in Dec12, 2016 providing Overseas Contingency 
Operation (OCO) funding and funding for various programs only, in which the DoN could 
only support overseas contingency operations and the specified programs. The CR impact the 
BSOs who were not involved in this type of operations and limited their spending. On May 4, 
2017, Congress signed an Omnibus (House of Representatives, 244, 2017), releasing the 
funding for the DoD and therefore giving the DoN and its BSOs four months to spend on a 
year’s worth of requirements. Other requirements could still be in existence from FY 2016 that 
were carried over to FY 2017, adding to more requirements that needed to be completed before 
the end of the fiscal year. Although the previous statement is speculative, FY 2017 was over 
budget by 21.37% (PBIS, 2015). This is the highest percent and dollar value budget difference 
among the years researched as reflected in our analysis and discussed in Chapter IV 
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Is there a statistical relationship between the variances identified in the proposed budget 
versus the executed budget and marks issued by OSD? 
In the analysis portion of this document, it is apparent that there is a statistical 
relationship among the ICCs, BLIs, and BSOs, but OSD markups do not necessarily contribute. 
As discussed in Chapter III, the average budget difference between the planned and 
appropriated budgets was 1.36%, indicating that the highest budget differences did not occur 
during these two iterations. The highest significant budget difference is seen between what is 
planned or appropriated and the actual dollar values. Since the OSD markups would be reflected 
in the appropriation phase, it is inferred that the OSD markup does not impact the budget 
differences because of the low percentage contributions. 
The two major contributors to the budget difference in the analysis were BSOs: 
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (60) and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (70), who have 
demonstrated repeated occurrences for being over and under budget (PBIS, 2015). Being over 
or under budget is not deliberately done by the BSOs, since they must be flexible and adapt 
their spending measures based on guidance received from OSD, which is continuously 
changing in support of the political environment. For example, a planned budget submitted by 
BSO (70) a year in advance is approved by Congress, but while executing the budget, two years 
after submission, the BSO can receive additional guidance from OSD. Additional guidance can 
be things such as an increase or decrease in force requirements, due to military operations 
around the world. It could be said that OSD indirectly affects the DoD budget. Although, this 
research found no evidence that the budget differences calculated are due to OSD markups. 
Can the statistical relationship be used to provide recommendations to OPNAV to lock 
appropriated customer accounts within the NWCF-SM budget horizon two years? 
It is difficult to say if the analysis conducted can be used to determine any regression 
model to help determine what kind of investment should be used to help support NAVSUP. By 
taking the mean budget percentage difference calculated for the programs that were the main 
contributors, one could apply the positive or negative budget percentage difference to 
NAVSUP’s NWCF investments and use that as the new amount for NAVSUP to invest. The 
problem with this logic is that the mean budget differences are just a snapshot in time for the 
years consisting of 2007–2017. Operational conflicts such as Operation Enduring Freedom, 
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Operation New Dawn, the various operations in Syria and Yemen have occurred in this 
timeframe. If events like these happen in the future it is not known to what extent these ships 
and aircraft will be utilized. Another problem that might significantly impact the DoD budget 
is when Congress cannot pass a working budget. This impacts how the DoD spends and when 
approval to spend is allowed, then that is known to skew spending measures for the rest of the 
FY. Therefore, in events like these applying the mean budget percentage difference calculated 
will not suffice. 
It does not seem realistic for OPNAV to lock any appropriated accounts for customers, 
since the OPTEMPO and schedule are in constant fluctuation, as seen in Chapter IV. It would 
be interesting to see what the periodicity that OPNAV communicates with the BSOs regarding 
changes in OPTEMPO (e.g., flight hours and steaming days). If the periodicity between 
OPNAV and the BSOs is not frequent, then missed opportunities for a more reliable budget is 
most likely occurring. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 
1. It is known that NAVSUP uses forecasting models, demand signals from the 
fleet/customer, and inputs to invest in their repair and consumable parts. 
Using simulations to compare the percentage NAVSUP uses to forecast in 
their forecasting models and the mean budget difference calculated in this 
research, then it would be worth looking at the difference in these figures, 
specifically for Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces and Commander, U.S. Pacific 
Fleet. 
2. In our analysis, it was determined that there was at least one CR enacted in 
all the years analyzed, except FY07 and FY09. FY13 had the most prolonged 
period of a DoD appropriation not approved by Congress, which consisted of 
176 days. Some FYs had multiple CRs, which are known to throttle the 
budget for BSOs, and it is uncertain how CRs impacts BSOs spending 
methods. Utilizing regression analysis, a comparison can be made from the 
number of CRs in any FY and the O&M,N budget. By understanding the 
correlation between CRs and fluctuations in the budget, it could assist in 
predicting the spending patterns of the BSOs. 
3. This research did not analyze the relationship between OCO and over/ under 
spending for BSOs. It might be beneficial to calculate and collect data 
amount of OCO funding and the budget difference calculated in the research 
analysis, to determine significant statistical relationships. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The research demonstrated that O&M,N was the most significant contributor for 
generating budget differences in dollar value and percent, out of all the various appropriation 
accounts for FY07-17. O&M,N is the appropriation account that is responsible for funding 
daily operations to the fleet, so it is no surprise that this account is the most significant 
contributor to the budget difference. 
The two programs under O&M,N that were the most significant contributors to budget 
difference consisted of Mission and Other Flight Hour Operations (1A1A) and Mission and 
Other Ship Operations (1B1B). These programs were consistently under and over budget 
during FY07-17 and had the greatest budget difference in dollars and percent. These programs 
are more susceptible to changes in the OPTEMPO and schedule, since they are directly linked 
to the DoN mission. 
Once the main contributing programs were identified, two BSOs were determined to 
be consistently over and under budget. BSOs (60) and (70) were consistently over and under 
budget during FY07-17. These BSOs are the owners of the assets that make up most forces 
within DoN. Therefore, if there is a change in operational tasking, this will have a direct impact 
to the O&M,N appropriation, which will alter the demand of major shipboard and aviation 
programs, and ultimately change how commands allocate their funding. 
E. RECOMMENDATION TO NAVSUP 
It is known that NAVSUP invests in their inventory to ensure that parts are readily 
available when customers require them, but the fluctuation in the DoD budget skews the 
accuracy of NAVSUP’s forecasting. The research analysis presented mean budget differences 
for O&M,N, and the major programs. Comparing the mean budget difference calculated and 
the NAVSUP forecasting dollar values, NAVSUP can adjust their forecasting dollar values to 
account for the budget fluctuation This could help NAVSUP stabilize supply and demand from 
customers. NAVSUP would need to monitor these mean budget differences carefully and need 
to re-calculate them on an annual basis. 
Since O&M,N has precise guidelines for obligating funding and the time allowed to 
execute funding, NAVSUP always has to take a calculated assessment in how much is 
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budgeted each year. It appears that if NAVSUP were able to update some of the variables that 
are used to calculate their estimates on a more regular basis, then that would allow them to 
adjust the amount of funding that is invested. Implementing this recommendation would assist 
NAVSUP in improving its inventory readiness. 
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APPENDIX. BUDGET DIFFERENCES FOR DETERMINED 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 50 - 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 51 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Blickstein, I., Yurchak, J. M., Martin, B., Sollinger, J. M., & Tremblay, D. (2016). Navy 
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution: A reference guide for senior 
leaders, managers, and action officers. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
CACI International Inc. (2015). Program Budget Information System (PBIS) user’s guide. 
(OPNAV N80 PBIS Document, Version 2.0). Arlington, VA: Author. 
Candreva, P. J. (2017). National defense budgeting and financial management: Policy and 
practice. Charlotte, NC: Information Age. 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2016, October). POM process reorganization and OPNAV staff 
realignment (NAVADMIN 231/16). Quantico, VA: Author. Retrieved from 
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/ 
NAVADMINS/NAV2016/NAV16231.txt 
Department of Defense. (2017, June). Department of Defense financial management 
regulation (DoD 7000.14-R). Washington, DC: Author. 
Department of the Navy, (2017, September). Department of the Navy, activity manpower 
management guide. Washington, DC: Author. 
Dortch, D. (2016, April 28). Naval Systems Command celebrates 50th anniversary. 
Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=94452 
Gabel, K. (2018). Employing supply chain analytics for logistics efficiencies. Navy Supply 
Corps Newsletter. Retrieved from https://scnewsltr.dodlive.mil/2018/06/ 
21/employing-supply-chain-analytics-for-logistics-efficiencies/ 
Haney, S. (2019, February 25). NAVSUP FLC Pearl Harbor hosts NAVSUP assistant 
commander for financial management and comptroller. Retrieved from 
https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=108683) 
Macdonald, S. (2013). The Navy Working Capital Fund budget & execution cycle. Navy 
Supply Corps Newsletter. Retrieved from https:// scnewsltr.dodlive.mil/2013/04/ 
22/the-navy-working-capital-fund-budget-execution-cycle/ 
McCaffery, J. L., & Jones, L. R. (2004). Reform of program budgeting in the Department of 
Defense (NPS-GSBPP-04-002). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Mistral Inc. (2013). PPBE Overlapping “Cycles.” PowerPoint Presentation. Retrieved from 
https://www.slidesshare.net/tomlindblad/ppbe-tutorial-nov-2013 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2018). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget estimates. Justification of 
estimates, Navy working capital fund. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. 
Retrieved from https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/19pres/ 
NWCF_Book.pdf 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 52 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2006). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2007 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2007aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2007). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2008/2009 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/ Pages/Fiscal-Year-2008aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2008). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2009.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2009). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2010.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2010). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2011.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2011). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2012 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2012.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2012). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2013 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2013.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2013). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2014 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2014.aspx 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 53 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2014). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2015 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2015.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2015). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2016 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2016.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2016). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2017.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2017). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2018.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Budget. (2018). 
Department of the Navy fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget estimates. 
Justification of estimates, operation and maintenance, Navy. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year- 2019.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and 
Comptroller. (2016). Department of the Navy (DoN) budget guidance 
manual. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and 
Comptroller. (2019). Financial management policy manual (FMPM). 
Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. 
Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (2000). Department of the 
Navy (DoN), Navy Working Capital Fund Annual Financial Report. 
Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. Retrieved from 
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/ 
45/documents/cfs/fy2000/23_Navy_WCF_FY2000.pdf 
Program Budget Information System (PBIS) (2015). (Version 5.0), [Database]. 
Retrieved on January 8, 2019 from 
https://pbisdb.nmci.navy.mil/pbis/Login.ctrl 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 54 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Spencer, N. (2017). NAVSUP Navy Working Capital Fund Supply Management 
(NWCF- SM) overview. Presentation, Naval Supply Systems Command 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Ingersoll Hall 
Monterey, CA 93943 
 www.acquisitionresearch.net 
 
 
